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Abstract
The paper focuses on party preferences of Turkish voters within the spatial model of voting
that proved to be a successful explanatory framework in various other countries. The analysis
is based on spatial theory of electoral competition and its statistical implementation using
survey data. The paper aims at depicting the cognitive organization of voters’ attitudes about
issues and evaluations of political parties that compete for their vote. The spatial map derived
from a survey of urban settlers show that the dominant ideological dimension sets secularists
vs. pro-Islamists as expected from the center-periphery framework often used in Turkish
electoral analyses. The second dimension reﬂects the impact of recent conﬂict involving the
Kurdish minority on rising nationalist sentiments. Given a general depiction of the Turkish
political space, we examine the impact of various demographic characteristics as well as issue
evaluations on individuals’ ideal positions in the space.
Over the last decade, once marginal parties with ultra nationalist and pro-Islamist
mandates rose to a dominant position in Turkish politics leading to a collapse of the
center-right competitors. Together with ethnic Kurdish support of about 5%, parties
of the extreme ends of the Turkish ideological space came to receive about 38% of
electoral support in April 1999 elections. In the next general elections of November
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2002, the centrist parties were able to gather only a mere minority of support with
about 38%.
The limited number of analyses focusing on this recent electoral experience
diagnoses demographic, socio-economic, cultural and ethnic bases of party support
together with a dominant impact of religiosity on voting decision. However, these
studies lack a coherent theoretical framework for explaining the voting decision. In
consequence, a sui generis character of the Turkish electorate emerges and leaves the
Turkish experience unlinked to a larger body of comparative and theoretical
research on voting behavior.
Our analysis adopts the theoretical framework of spatial voting models and oﬀers
a multi-dimensional analysis of the emerging ideological space in Turkey during the
years preceding the general elections in November 2002. Kalaycıog˘lu (1998) and
Hale (2002) provide intuitive two-dimensional representations of the political space
of Turkey without formal voting theory or empirically based behavioral
foundations. Our approach, however, is grounded on spatial theory of electoral
competition and its statistical implementation with survey data from a nation-wide
representative sample of the urban electorate in FebruaryeMarch 2001. We estimate
the spatial positions of all major political parties along with respondent ideal points
in a two-dimensional ideological space and show that these two dimensions capture
the basic character of issue positions and social cleavages that shape the Turkish
electoral scene.1
Very much in line with the center-periphery framework of Mardin (1973), our
two-dimensional ideological map reﬂects pro-Islamist elements of the periphery as
opposed to the secularist center as its dominant dimension.2 Turkish nationalism,
deﬁned largely in opposition to rising ethnic Kurdish identity of the late 1990s,
appears as a secondary dimension of ideological competition. We thus present party
positions for the Sunni pro-Islamist as opposed to secularist parties in contrast to
parties that diﬀerentiate from one another on the ethnically deﬁned nationalistic
perspectives. Our simple spatial exposition of party competition accounts not only
for the speciﬁcity of Turkish ideological competition but it also oﬀers a reﬂection of
1 The conventional lefteright (LeR) framework has never been fully adopted in analyzing Turkish
politics. From early 1970s on parties have used the LeR language. However, principally as a result of the
rise of nationalist and pro-Islamist agendas, the increasing salience of identity politics during the 1990s and
the consequent collapse of the centrist parties, the appeal of the LeR framework has declined. Parties of
the center have taken positions primarily in reaction to threats from these new electoral forces that
contradicted expectations. The salience of the constituent parts of the LeR, that is, the distributional
economic issues, the role of the state have shrunk in comparison to issues of ethnicity, nationalism and
pro-Islamism.
2 The Turkish society is divided into two major sects of Sunnis and Alevis, among the Sunnis into Haneﬁ
and Shaﬁ schools of law (mezhep), and then between those who take Sunni Islam seriously in organizing
their lifestyles and those who take a secular or anti clerical (laik) view of life. The Alevis historically being
in a minority position have tended to support the secularist policies of the Republican era, which provided
protection against Sunni infringements in their religious freedoms. Hence the term pro-Islamist here refers
to Sunni reactionism to secularist Republican establishment.
the same framework of the spatial voting theory developed in Enelow and Hinich
(1984) and extended in Hinich and Munger (1994).3
The HinicheMunger theory of spatial ideology is superﬁcially similar to the
spatial ideological dimension of Downs (1957). Both theories treat the space as latent
although Downs is not explicit about what can and cannot be observed in his theory.
The major diﬀerence between the Downs and HinicheMunger concepts of spatial
ideology lies in how the ideological space is developed over time. Hinich and Munger
(1994) assert that the dimension (or dimensions) arises out of competition for
political power by politicians, parties, and their supporters. Parties and factions
therein attempt to gain power by creating arguments as to why they should displace
the status quo.
The latent space is the underlying reality of a society’s politics even though it is
not completely perceived by the politicians, their supporters, and the general public.
Simplicity and heuristic appeal render single dimensional treatments abound despite
the multi-dimensional complexity of the real world political competition. Journalists
would describe politicians and parties as if they were points on a lefteright (LeR)
scale. The connections between these ‘‘points’’ and issues that the public is concerned
about are typically either not stated or at best left fuzzy. However, a latent multi-
dimensional ideological space can be estimated from data by a variety of methods.
The striking ﬁnding from diﬀerent studies of polities using various methods on
perceptual and attitudinal data from public opinion surveys is that the latent spaces
are either one dimensional Downs type spaces or more frequently have two
dimensions. The meaning of these dimensions requires a linkage between positions
on the latent dimension(s) and the salient issues. A theoretical model of how the
latent ideological space links with issues was ﬁrst made by Hinich and Pollard (1981)
and then extended by Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Hinich and Munger (1994). In
contrast to exploratory analyses in various forms of discriminant and factor analysis,
the empirical extension of the spatial voting theory oﬀers a direct link to a formal
mathematical model of preference formation and choice. Besides the American
elections, these models have been tested in a variety of political contexts including
Ukraine (Hinich et al., 1999), Chile (Dow, 1998a,b), Russia (Myagov and Ordeshook,
3 At ﬁrst sight it might not be clear as to why Turkish politics has to be represented by two rather than
a single or higher dimensions, or why it has to have the particular interpretations we focus on. Our
analyses follow the recent tradition of spatial voting analyses and provide an empirical basis to our
interpretation of the two dimensions derived from a priori analytical principles. The fact that our data
supports a two-dimensional interpretation of Turkish politics, would not have necessarily implied an
inherent superiority if there were no a priori theoretical reasons to guide our expectations in this direction.
Such theoretical arguments were made by Hale (2002) and Kalaycıog˘lu (1998), but our analysis is the ﬁrst
with an empirical basis. Our analyses below are not meant to be a test of the superiority of the single as
opposed to a multi-dimensional framework. From the perspective of campaign management or individual
rational voters trying to make sense of the political world as quickly as possible, the appeal of the simple
LeR dimension still continues. Our multivariate analyses of the two dimensions derived also show the
unique relevance of the LeR dimension. However, as we underline below, the LeR framework only
accounts for a fraction of the variation of placements on the two estimated dimensions not explaining the
speciﬁcities of placements therein.
1998) and Taiwan (Lin et al., 1996). These empirical applications in diﬀerent
country contexts oﬀer a test of generalizability of the spatial theory. We observe in
these works a continuing support for the low dimensionality of political spaces and
diagnose that the estimated political spaces account for much of the country
speciﬁc questions about coalition potential, stability of political rhetoric and the
like.
In the context of Turkey, we want to learn the extent to which voters are able to
form a coherent map of policy predispositions of the parties that seek their support.
Did the collapse of the center-right leave them in a political vacuum that makes them
easily mobilized by a candidate’s or party’s appeal on various issues that may bear
reﬂections of destabilizing extremism? Or alternatively, do they possess a stable
centrist conceptual scheme that acts as a buﬀer in front of highly volatile short-term
preference shifts?
1. Motivation for a spatial analysis: an outline of recent Turkish electoral history
The 1990s witnessed the emergence of the pro-Islamist followed by the ultra-
nationalist parties that had remained in the fringes of the electoral scene in the
preceding decades.4 Starting from a mere 7.2% electoral base in 1987, the pro-
Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) continuously raised its appeal to masses.
In 1994 municipal elections, it captured the largest metropolitan centers and in less
than two years later became the largest party with only 21.4% of the vote in 1995
election.5 Never before did the pro-Islamist tradition capture more than 12% of the
popular vote alone.6
In the aftermath of the 1995 general election, RP formed a coalition with the
centrist True Path Party (Dog˘ru Yol Partisi, DYP) that led to a series of secularist
reactions polarizing the Sunnis against Alevis and even widening the existing
cleavages between the Turkish and the rising Kurdish nationalists.7 The months
leading to the 1999 general election have witnessed the momentous capture of the
4 See C¸arkog˘lu (2002) on Turkish political parties in late 1990s.
5 RP had its roots in the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) that followed the
National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP).
6 For being against the secular regime, both MNP and MSP had been banned by the military regimes of
1971 and 1980 respectively. See among others C¸arkog˘lu and Toprak (2000), Go¨le (1997), Heper (1997),
Mardin (1989), Sayarı (1996), Toprak (1981), Yavuz (1997) on Islam and politics in Turkey.
7 The Constitutional Court (CC) closed down RP in January 1998 on the grounds that the speeches of
several party leaders were against the secular constitution banning the former Prime Minister Erbakan and
ﬁve other prominent members of the party from political activity for ﬁve years. By the end of April the
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) became the new address of almost all of the unbarred RP deputies. CC
eventually closed down FP in June 2001 on similar grounds to those of the RP case. Following FP’s
closure the inner party struggle led to the founding of two separate parties; one for the old-guard in the
pro-Islamist movement the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) and the other for the young generation the
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) which eventually came to power after
the November 2002 elections.
leader of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Ku¨rdistan, PKK),
widening corruption scandals, mass demonstrations against the religiously sensitive
ban of headscarves at the universities, as well as the death of the ultra-nationalist
Alparslan Tu¨rkesx who was the founding leader of the Nationalist Action Party
(Milliyetc¸i Hareket Partisi, MHP) that led to an eventual reshaping of the MHP
image.8 As a result, the nationalist fervor in the country was on the rise. The
Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) has greatly beneﬁted from these
developments and became the largest party in 1999 with 22.2% of the vote. MHP
captured the second largest vote share reaching nearly 18%, up by about 120% from
its share in 1995.9
The tenure of the coalition of DSP, MHP and ANAP in the aftermath of April
1999 elections began with two massive earthquakes in August and November. The
perceived ineﬀectiveness of the organization of public relief eﬀorts in the aftermath
of the August 1999 earthquake not only enervated the grieving public but also
proved once again the inaptitude of public authorities. However, the parliamentary
seat distribution, together with the inability of the civic anger to raise the pressure on
the government, helped the coalition to survive the political after-shocks of the
earthquake. The impact of the ﬁnancial crisis that hit the country ﬁrst in November
2000 and next in February 2001 had been much more severe on the political front.
Political manipulations of ﬁscal policies leading to an unsustainable public debt were
commonly diagnosed as the underlying reason for these crises. The crisis peaked on
21 February, 2001 with an overnight devaluation of the Turkish lira by about 50%.
By the end of the year, about 2.3 million people had lost their jobs and the economy
had contracted in real terms as much as 8.5%. The coalition partners were perceived
as responsible for the economic crises and their clumsiness in responding to the
earthquakes. The centrist opposition however, could not take advantage of these
developments.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant ﬁnding in all surveys of the Winter and Spring 2001
reported in newspapers is the large portion of the respondents (26.1%) who declare
that they would not vote for any one of the existing parties and an equally surprising
10% who declare that they would cast an invalid protest vote.10 The fact that in
November 2002 general election turnout rate remained at 79% lowest since 1977,
points to the correctness of these diagnoses. In short, during the ﬁrst part of 2001
when our survey was carried out, about one third of the electorate were not
undecided, but rather decided not to cast their votes for any one of the then existing
8 MHP has its roots in the Republican Peasant Nation Party (Cumhuriyetc¸i Ko¨ylu¨ Millet Partisi, CKMP)
founded in the aftermath of the 1960 military coup. Alparslan Tu¨rkesx was its leader until his death in 1997.
Tu¨rkesx was an active colonel in the coup of 1960 and a member of the ruling junta. MHP remained
marginal in the Turkish party system from the very beginning, up until the 1999 election. See Landau
(1995) and Poulton (1997) on the nationalist tradition in Turkey.
9 Throughout the last, nearly two decades, for which we have data, most of the Turkish voters remained
around centrist positions along the conventional LeR continuum (Ergu¨der, 1980e81; Kalaycıog˘lu, 1994;
C¸arkog˘lu, 1998; C¸arkog˘lu and Toprak, 2000).
10 Radikal Daily newspaper, 14 May, 2001.
parties. This alone was enough to bring uneasiness to the party system and thus
possibilities of leadership changes, as well as establishment of new parties under
possibly fresh leadership.11
In this turbulent decade, religiosity, more than any other variable, is found to
aﬀect Turkish voters’ choice among competing parties. In only two of the most
recent surveys, researchers identify varying degrees of retrospective, as well as
prospective economic evaluations on party choice.12 Yet, even when these eﬀects are
present, their magnitudes are small compared to the religiosity eﬀect.
The rise of pro-Islamism from a marginal to an almost dominant position in
Turkish electoral politics has led many to worry that a deep-rooted schism has come
to the forefront of Turkish politics. Similarly, the rise of MHP presents yet another
challenge of changing an inclusive Turkish identity that was confronted by a growing
Kurdish nationalism in the country.13 The ethnic-based conception of nationalism is
in stark contrast to religious Islamic community conception of the pro-Islamist
movement that draws on the Ottoman heritage of millet (nation). While MHP was
thriving on rising exclusionist ethnic fervor due to Kurdish separatist movement,
RP/FP was oﬀering an inclusive Islamic uniﬁcation with a tone of anti-secularism
aiming, among other conservative constituencies, to appeal to Kurdish constituen-
cies.
Rising pro-Islamist and nationalist attraction among the Turkish electorate can
be taken as a reﬂection of strengthening peripheral forces within S¸erif Mardin’s
(1973) center-periphery paradigm. Following Mardin’s (1973) seminal work others
have also argued that Turkish politics is built around a strong and coherent state
apparatus run by a distinct group of elites dominated by the military and
bureaucracy. The ‘‘center’’ is confronted by a heterogeneous and habitually hostile
‘‘periphery’’, composed mainly of peasantry, small farmers and artisans. The
periphery can be seen as the complement of the center, which is built around
Kemalist secular principles and follows a state run nationalist modernization
program. The periphery reﬂects features of a subject and parochial orientation built
around resentful cynicism toward hierarchical and coercive modernization of the
center and includes religious and ethnic groups with often-conﬂicting interests and
political strategies.
During the formative years of competitive party system in Turkey the Democrat
Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) brought together the heterogeneous peripheral forces
and dominated the polls. The peripheral coalition was broken by the 1961 coup into
11 FP’s closure by the Constitutional Court in June 2001 immediately led to founding of two new parties
reﬂecting the inner split of the pro-Islamists between the ‘‘old guards’’ under SP and the younger
generation under AKP. The Young Party (Genc¸ Parti, GP) was founded in Summer 2002 by Cem Uzan,
a business tycoon with a blemished background adopting a populist agenda. AKP and GP were able to
garner 41.5% of support in 2002 when the ruling coalition of DSP-MHP-ANAP lost 38.7 percentage
points from their 1999 vote shares.
12 See Esmer (2001); Kalaycıog˘lu (1994, 1999) and C¸arkog˘lu and Toprak (2000) on religiosity and voting
behavior.
13 See Kirisxci and Winrow (1997) on Kurdish identity politics in Turkey.
three groups, one representing moderate right-wing, the others ultra-nationalist and
pro-Islamist constituencies. The centrist tradition was also broken by the 1980 coup.
Until the general elections of 2002, CHP and DSP remained as the two major
representatives of this tradition. CHP was stricter on the secularist dimension while
DSP, remaining more lenient on secularism, leaned more toward nationalist
positions in the 1990s. This picture became more complicated with the rise to
power of AKP in the 2002 general elections. Our ensuing analysis is based on data
preceding the founding of AKP in the summer of 2001. However, our ﬁndings
provide clues as to the reasons for their remarkable success in November 2002.14 We
speciﬁcally ask the following questions: What is the underlying ideological structure
of Turkish voters’ preferences of political parties? Are the rising religious and
nationalist movements reﬂecting traces of the center-periphery cleavage molding
Turkish politics? Are the divisive issues of headscarf ban and education in Kurdish
being reﬂected in the perception maps of the political space in Turkey?
We now turn to the methodology and data used in our analysis.
2. Methods and data
Intuitively our method is similar to the problem of estimating positions of a set of
targets in a multidimensional Euclidean space from distances reported by a number
of observers who do not know their own positions in the space. Each observer
reports the distance from the observer to each target plus or minus a random error.
This statistical problem is the basic model for the various forms of what is called
multidimensional unfolding in the psychometric literature.15 The method used in this
paper deals with estimating the target locations and the observer positions from data
that are functions of the Euclidean or squared Euclidean distances between observers
and targets observed with an additive random error. While the use of scaling and
unfolding in psychological applications do not use a utility-based theory, we use the
utility-based choice theory presented in Enelow and Hinich (1984).16 The utility-
based choice theory in a spatial setting links utility maximizing voters (observers) to
parties (targets) competing for voters’ support in a multidimensional space shaped
by salient issues on the public agenda. As such, our method estimates the structure of
the party positions in a latent political space with respect to voters’ own positions in
14 The fact that the pro-Islamists of AKP have won the premiership of the 2002 general election and as
a consequence MHP was pushed out of the parliament does not mean that the nationalists are totally out
of the Turkish electoral picture. The nationalists could regain their power if for example Turkey gets
involved in an international conﬂict such as the one in neighboring Iraq or Turkish application for EU
membership is somehow delayed or turned down.
15 Multidimensional scaling and unfolding has been applied in marketing, anthropology, psychology, and
sociology (Weller and Romney, 1990), political science (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 1991, 1997; Poole,
2000), and in engineering signal processing (Cahoon and Hinich, 1976). See Borg and Groenen (1997) for
a review of some of these techniques.
16 The method builds on the work of Cahoon (1975), Cahoon et al. (1978) and Hinich (1978).
a latent political space that then is directly linked to issues of importance for voters
and parties alike in the electoral system.
The methodology we apply here requires a set of assumptions relating the data
to a spatial model.17 First, the scores given to each party is assumed to be
a monotonically decreasing function of the Euclidian distance between the position
of the party in the space and the most preferred ideological position of the
respondent. This position is called the ideal point. The respondent is not required to
articulate that position but rather it is a latent position in the latent space. Second,
the constellation of the party positions in the latent space is assumed to be the same
across all respondents. The only thing that diﬀers from respondent to respondent is
their personal ideal points. From the individual scores we ﬁrst determine the
dimensionality of the political space. Next we estimate the party positions and the
ideal points for the individuals.
Our data come from a nationwide representative survey of urban population
conducted during the chaotic weeks of the second economic crisis of February
2001.18 A total of 1201 face-to-face interviews were conducted in 12 of the 81
provinces. The questionnaires were administered, between 20 February and 16
March, 2001, by using a ‘‘random sampling’’ method with an objective to represent
the nation-wide voting age urban population living within municipality borders, in
which the urban population ﬁgures of 1997 census data were taken as the basis.19
Since the new pro-Islamist parties, i.e. SP and AKP, were formed in the aftermath of
the closure of FP in June 2001, our data only reﬂect the evaluations concerning FP
and not SP and AKP.
The wording of the questions used in our analyses to obtain an estimate of each
respondent’s cardinal evaluation of parties is given in Appendix A. For each
question the same set of evaluations for the seven major parties were asked. These
parties obtained 94.8% of the urban vote in 1999 elections (Table 1). However, as of
February-March 2001, these parties comprise only the preferences of 42.3% of our
urban sample. Similar to opinion poll results reported in the media, our ﬁndings also
indicate that 6% of the respondents will not cast their vote and about 5% are
undecided as to which party to vote for. More signiﬁcantly, nearly 33% of the
respondents indicate that they will not cast their vote for any one of the existing
parties. Given the continual crisis atmosphere in the country, the erosion of electoral
17 Since our analysis here is merely an application of the techniques developed elsewhere we refrain from
going into any technical details which can be found in Enelow and Hinich (1984), chapter 9; Enelow and
Hinich (1990); Endersby and Hinich (1992); Hinich (1978); Hinich and Munger (1994).
18 Nearly 35% of the Turkish population lives in rural settlements that are not included in our sample.
Just a generation ago in 1980 the share of rural population was 56%. Accordingly, a large segment of the
urban dwellers are either born in rural areas or are newcomers to the cities and thus are expected to possess
preferences and attitudes similar to rural settlers. The timing of our research could also conceivably have
temporal peculiarities. However, until new data become available we have no basis for judging the extent
to which ruraleurban divide is signiﬁcant or to what extent our results are time wise sensitive.
19 Details of the sampling procedure can be obtained from the authors. Under the assumption of simple
random sampling, a sample size of 1201 is expected to have a conﬁdence interval of 95% with an error
margin of G2.8%.
support for the coalition partners, which amounts to a total of about 39 percentage
points in the urban areas, is not surprising.20 Among the opposition, only the left-
leaning CHP and pro-Kurdish HADEP seem to maintain their urban constituencies.
The rest of the opposition parties are also found to have lost their supporters.21
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the thermometer scores for all major
parties, three hypothetical leaders and an evaluation of the coalition performance of
DSPeMHPeANAP. The highest mean score is given to our hypothetical labor
leader closely followed by a prominent businessman. As a reﬂection of the above
underlined alienation of masses from the political parties in the aftermath of the
economic crises, respondents perceive the potential beneﬁt of our hypothetical
Table 1
Party preferences after distributing the undecided respondents
Urban sample
(NZ1201) %
Urban vote
share in 1999 %
Rural vote
share in 1999 %
Country total
in 1999 %
ANAP 4.9 13.2 13.4 13.2
CHP 9.6 9.4 7.7 8.7
DSP 3.5 24.5 18.3 22.2
DYP 5.9 9.3 16.5 12
FP 5.9 16.1 14.3 15.4
MHP 7.5 17.1 19.3 18
HADEP 5.0 5.2 4.0 4.7
Seven party total 42.3 94.8 93.5 94.2
Will not vote 6.0
Will vote
for none of the existing parties
32.6
Undecided 4.8
Will vote for one of the existing
minor parties
5.8
No answer 8.4
Total 100
 Respondents were ﬁrst asked which party they would vote for if an election were to be held today.
Those who indicated that they are undecided (10.8% in our sample) were then asked whether they feel
closer to voting for a party. The results in the table are obtained after distributing the choices indicated in
this second question to the their respective parties in the ﬁrst question. The reported 4.8% undecided
respondents are those who remained undecided in the second question.
20 At the time of our writing of this article the urbanerural divide in 2002 general election was not
oﬃcially available. However, looking at the overall nationwide vote percentage of the two parties that did
not exist at the time of our ﬁeldwork, that is AKP and GP, we see that their total nationwide support
totaled approximately 41.5%, which is quite close to our urban sample results from nearly 18 months
before the general election.
21 In all of our questions the non-response rate remained quite low for all our parties at about 5e7%. As
noted earlier, participation was the lowest in the post 1980 period. The fact that coalition partners also
received 14.7% of the vote in 2002, down from 53.4% in 1999 shows that our sample results give quite an
accurate picture of the electoral scene in the pre-election months for the November 2002 election.
working class or business leaders’ tenure in the executive oﬃce to be signiﬁcantly
higher than those of the known major political parties. Among the political parties
CHP obtains the highest score followed by ANAP, DYP and MHP. HADEP, FP
and DSP have the worst performance among the parties. A ‘‘very religious’’ leader is
rated better than only HADEP, which predominantly was being rated non-favorably
by respondents who have a non-Kurdish background. Most striking is the
observation that the ruling DSPeMHP and ANAP coalition at the time of our
ﬁeldwork is rated with the lowest scores. On face value of these thermometer scores it
is inconceivable that a purely religiously oriented party could capture the alienated
masses in the party system. Our discussion below indicates that within a two-
dimensional space such an interpretation has to be qualiﬁed.
3. A spatial map of issue dimensions in Turkish politics
As a ﬁrst step in our analysis we estimate the spatial positions of the seven parties
evaluated by our respondents following the procedures in Enelow and Hinich (1984,
chapter 9). Fig. 1 presents the two-dimensional estimates of these party positions
together with the voters’ ideal points in this space. Looking at Fig. 1, we observe that
parties are clearly diﬀerentiated on the two dimensions explaining about 61% of the
variance.22
The x-axis posits the pro-Islamist FP in one extreme as opposed to the secularist
left leaning CHP. The relative positions of the rest of the parties ﬁt our expectations
about the religious cleavage in Turkish politics. The nationalist MHP turns out to be
the closest one to the position of the pro-Islamist FP on this axis. Among the centrist
parties DYP is slightly closer to the pro-Islamist end while DSP and CHP are on the
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of thermometer scores
Party/ (hypothetical politician) Mean Std. Deviation
A labor leader 4.88 2.67
A prominent businessman 4.59 2.74
CHP 4.44 2.32
ANAP 4.43 1.97
DYP 4.24 2.17
MHP 3.89 2.70
DSP 3.88 2.30
FP 3.81 2.78
A very religious leader 3.74 2.96
HADEP 3.06 2.85
The present coalition of DSPeMHPeANAP 2.66 2.40
Valid N (listwise) 1148
22 The ﬁrst accounts for 38.5% whereas the second is 22.9% of the variance.
opposing end placed to the left of ANAP’s position in the center. It is noticeable that
HADEP’s position on this dimension is closer to the secularist left of DSP and CHP.
The y-axis places the Kurdish HADEP on one extreme and the nationalist MHP
and DSP on the other. While ANAP, CHP and FP’s positions come close to the
center on this dimension, DYP is placed closer to the nationalist MHP and DSP’s
opposing end. It has been suggested that FP’s strong showing in the East and
Southeastern provinces where the bulk of Kurdish population lives is evidence of
FP’s appeal to the Kurdish electorate. Ideologically, the all-inclusive concept of
millet advocated by FP is seen to target the Kurdish vote. Similarly, the religiously
conservative Kurdish constituency was seen closer to FP. Our map however, clearly
shows that in the perceptions of the urban population, HADEP is nowhere close to
FP on the two-dimensional political space we derive.
HADEP and FP are equally isolated from the rest of the parties. Opposing FP on
the x-axis, CHP also stands apart from the rest of the parties. While the centrist
positions on the x-axis do not allow for much of diﬀerentiation among the MHP,
DYP and ANAP, the y-axis representing the nationalist cleavage in Turkish politics
clearly separates the centrist ANAP from the more nationalist DYP and MHP.
According to the perception in the minds of the urban voters, DSP stands on the
opposing extreme of the Kurdish HADEP. More importantly, we should note that
a single dimensional analysis along the lines of our x-axis as reﬂection of a LeR
ideological divide simply would not allow for such subtle diﬀerentiation on non-
trivial matters as the ethnic nationalist cleavage.
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Fig. 1. Estimated ideal points and party positions, full sample.
Together with the seven major parties, we also asked evaluations of hypothetical
candidates. Given the alienation of voters from the political establishment, inclusion
of only the parties already in existence would not have provided enough information
about the spread of choices in the political space. Clearly, these hypothetical
personalities cannot be treated as political parties. However, their estimated
positions are to be interpreted with reference to their closeness to real parties in
existence at the time of our ﬁeldwork. Not surprisingly, a ‘‘very religious’’ leader is
estimated very close to FP while a prominent businessman stands close to ANAP. A
labor leader is positioned very close to HADEP and apart from the rest of the
parties, especially of the left. Given HADEP’s extremist left-wing rhetoric on many
issues such a positioning is not surprising. In short, the information provided by the
hypothetical leaders helps us identify the meaning of the dimensions of the political
space.
The ideal point estimates for each individual in our sample is also shown on
Fig. 1. The striking observation from these ideal point estimates is the centrist
tendencies of a large segment of the voters. Although we observe voters dispersed
towards the end points of the two dimensions, the bulk of the voters are found close
to the center of the two dimensions.
When we calculate the mean positions of constituencies across diﬀerent parties we
observe the relative standings of the parties with respect to their supporters. Fig. 2
reveals that the mean ideal points of CHP, DSP, FP and HADEP voters are more
towards the center on both dimensions than their respective party positions. The
estimated location of DSP lies at the most extreme point on the second dimension
revealing a strong Turkish nationalist standing as opposed to the Kurdish nationalist
standing of HADEP. However, the mean ideal point estimates of those who declared
their intention to vote for DSP is quite distant from this party location estimate and
lie closer to the center of the two dimensions. Similarly, for both HADEP and FP
constituencies we observe that they stand relatively at a more centrist position on
both dimensions compared to the estimated party stand. In contrast, we observe that
for both DYP and MHP the mean ideal positions of their constituencies tend more
toward the pro-Islamist end of the ﬁrst dimension. In other words, the pro-Islamist
constituency in Turkey is no longer dominated by the MNP/MSP/RP and FP
tradition.23
Given the high percentage of respondents refusing to vote for any one of the
existing parties, the positioning of those voters on our ideological map becomes quite
interesting. Those who assert that they will not cast a vote as well as those who assert
that they will not vote for any of the presently available parties lie on average very
close to the center of our map. The extreme ends of our map are not particularly
attractive to these voters and they seem to lie on average close to ANAP and our
hypothetical prominent businessman rather than any of the other major parties.
First immediate implications of this observation is that despite apparent tensions in
23 C¸arkog˘lu and Toprak (2000, p. 23) also note that, besides the FP, DYP and MHP constituencies also
tend toward religious conservatism.
Turkish political scene arising from secularist versus pro-Islamist issue diﬀerences or
recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity, the average alienated voter is in the center of
the political space. Second, despite minimal voter support it apparently receives at
the time of our ﬁeldwork, ANAP more than any other major party lies closer to the
preferences of those urban voters who are yet to make up their minds about their
party of choice in the future. It is also worth noting that the appeal of a businessman
in the political space at the time of our ﬁeldwork is partially materialized in the
personality of Cem Uzan and his GP, which garnered about 7.3% of the votes in
2002 election at the expense of primarily the incumbent coalition partners. A
shortcoming of our survey was that no questions were asked about competence,
credibility or honesty of the parties or hypothetical leaders. This prevented us from
developing a valence dimension that could have allowed us to predict voters’ party
switching driven by the valence dimension. In short, the key question about the
future of party competition at the time of our ﬁeldwork was about the struggle to
appeal to the centrist constituency of voters.
So far our diagnosis about the nature of the two dimensions remained primarily
on our a priori expectations and knowledge about the nature of diﬀerent parties’
positions with respect to one another rather than on the content of argumentation
that shape these two dimensions. When we turn to various other issue positions of
the urban respondents in conjunction with their estimated ideal points, we obtain
a much more meaningful picture of the simple dimensionality of ideological
competition in Turkey.
Several questions about the self-ascribed identity of our respondents help us
further clarify the nature of both dimensions (see Fig. 3). When we look at self-
evaluation of religiosity we see that those respondents who consider themselves to be
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Fig. 2. Estimated party (in capital letters) and mean constituency positions (in lowercase).
very religious on a 0 to 10 scale of religiosity tend to be placed on the extreme right
end side of the ﬁrst dimension opposing those who consider themselves to be non-
religious. Those who primarily consider themselves to be Muslims rather than Turks,
Turkish citizens, Kurds or Alevis are situated very close to the same extreme right
end of the ﬁrst dimension. Similarly, those who prefer Turkey to be part of the
Islamic world are to be found at the same right-end of the ﬁrst dimension. We also
observe that the respondents whose ideal points lie at the right-end of the ﬁrst
dimension also tend to have a very liberal stand on the issue of headscarves and
turban in universities advocating for no restrictions on religiously meaningful attire
in universities (see Fig. 4). In contrast, those who support banning of headscarves
and turban at the universities are found on the opposing side.
Looking at the ideal points of those respondents who consider themselves to be
primarily Alevis we see that the mean of their ideal points lies on the complete
opposite end of the ﬁrst dimension suggesting that the religiosity of the pro-Islamist
end reﬂects mainly the Sunni school. The ﬁrst dimension thus mirrors Sunni Haneﬁ
religiousness as opposed to Alevi’s, which appear closer to not only the centrist left
CHP a la Mardin (1973) but also those who do not consider themselves to be
religious at all.
Looking at the ﬁrst dimension from the perspective of simple demographic
attributes of the urban respondents, we observe that the pro-Islamist respondents
tend to come from the Eastern rather than the Western provinces. Primary school
and junior high graduates are on average to be found near the pro-Islamist end
whereas those with a university degree or higher level of education lie on the
opposing end. Relatively younger voters between the ages of 18 and 24 are closer on
average to the pro-Islamist end whereas older voters tend to lie on the opposing end.
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Fig. 3. Mean party constituency positions and primary identity groups.
Shantytown dwellers are more likely to be found on the pro-Islamist end whereas
those respondents who live in luxurious dwellings are located near the opposing end.
We also asked the respondents to evaluate the controversial issue of education in
Kurdish. Positions of respondents on this issue help clarify the nature of the second
dimension (see Fig. 4). Those respondents who take a conservative stand and
support complete banning of education in Kurdish are to be found on the lower end
of the second dimension whereas those who support education in Kurdish are on
average to be found on the opposing end. Those who consider themselves to be
primarily Kurds lie towards the upper end of the second dimension opposing those
respondents who primarily consider themselves to be Turks or Turkish citizens (see
Fig. 3). Those who can speak Kurdish are at the upper end of the second dimension
whereas those who cannot speak Kurdish lie on the opposing end. Those
respondents who prefer Turkey to be part of the ‘‘Turkish world’’ lie on the
Turkish end of the second dimension whereas those who prefer membership in the
EU lie towards the centrist positions on both the ﬁrst and second dimensions. On
the ethnic Kurdish end we observe low levels of education. Low levels of income are
associated with the Kurdish end whereas higher income levels are to be found among
the respondents that are closer to the Turkish end. Western and relatively older
respondents are also closer to the same Turkish end.
In short, the two dimensions derived from the data correspond closely to the
fundamental cleavages that shaped the recent political scene in Turkey. The ﬁrst
dimension posits the secularists coalescing with the Alevis as opposed to the Sunni
Haneﬁ pro-Islamists. The policy reﬂections of the ﬁrst dimension appear in the
contrasting positions concerning the turban ban in universities. Those who prefer
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Fig. 4. Mean positions across diﬀerent issue stands.
Turkey to be part of the EU (Islamic world) tend to be closer to the secularist (Sunni
pro-Islamist) end of the ﬁrst dimension closer to the Alevis (religious Sunnis). The
second dimension separates the ethnic Kurdish from the Turkish nationalists. Those
who speak Kurdish are closer to those who have a liberal position on education in
Kurdish opposing those who cannot speak Kurdish and who are opposed to lifting
of the ban on education in Kurdish.
Contrasting the ﬁrst dimension to the second we also see traces of a meta-
morphosis in the Turkish political scene. One that evolves around secular
modernization and its pro-Islamist reactionaries that ﬁnd a reﬂection in still
evolving LeR rhetoric in Turkish political debate.24 Instead of a materialist clash
between the working masses and the bourgeoisie we see a struggle between
a modernizing centrist elite and the conservative parochial forces of the periphery.
This perhaps is the Turkish version of the conventional western LeR framework.
The second dimension however, is reﬂective of a more recent debate in Turkish
politics that revolves around identity issues. These issues, are directly linked to the
on-going EU reform movement in the country. As the Copenhagen Criteria
adjustment packages were being debated and passed from the Parliament during the
tenure of the DSPeMHPeANAP coalition the expected and well-predictable stands
of the parties in the system have had to change and re-positioned. Our two
dimensions mirror a clear interplay between the status quo secularist vs. pro-Islamist
(or, a` la Turca LeR) debate and the newly salient issues of identity that form the
agenda of the EU reform in the country.
Our estimated map also provides clues as to the nature of ideological competition
in the Turkish party system. On our map there is no party that is placed on the pro-
Islamist and Kurdish nationalist quadrant (Q.1 on Fig. 2). The Kurdish nationalism
of HADEP is clearly placed in the minds of the urban Turkish electorate on the
secularist end of the ﬁrst dimension (Q.4 on Fig. 2). While HADEP is the only party
on quadrant four, CHP and DSP dominate the secularist Turkish nationalist end of
quadrant 3. It is clear in the minds of the urban Turkish electorate that the centrist
right wing of the Turkish party system is not taking any position near the secularist
end of the ﬁrst dimension and rather leaning toward the Turkish nationalist and pro-
Islamist rhetoric. Four major parties (MHP, DYP, FP and ANAP) at the time of our
survey compete on the same quadrant that is the pro-Islamist and Turkish
nationalist quadrant 2, where the toughest competition is expected to take place.
The CHP and DSP voters are estimated to lie close to those that consider
themselves not religious and supportive of the ban on headscarves and turban at
universities. Interestingly, the left secularist-end of the ﬁrst dimension does not have
a clear primary identity preference other than Alevi. The secularist end is also not
very close to being supportive of the EU membership while its opposing end is quite
close to being supportive of Turkey to take part in the ‘‘Islamic world’’ and clearly
considering themselves to be primarily Muslim. ANAP and DYP voters tend to have
a moderate view on turban and headscarf ban as well as on education in Kurdish. FP
24 See C¸arkog˘lu (1998) on the evolution of LeR in Turkey.
voters are closer to the most liberal end of the turban issue while the MHP voters
oppose education in Kurdish.
Having validated our interpretation of the two dimensions, what factors then
explain the urban voters’ ideal positions on these two dimensions? Table 3 shows the
results of multiple regression analysis for the two dimensions. We expect substantial
noise to be present in our estimated ideal positions for respondents. However, since
these estimated ideal points are used as dependent variables in our equations and
since our independent variables are mainly demographic variables in which
measurement error can be assumed to be reasonably small, the coeﬃcient estimates
should be consistent. Nevertheless, the standard errors of our estimates are likely to
be quite large rendering statistical signiﬁcance diﬃcult to achieve.25
Table 3 shows that despite expected inﬂation of standard errors of estimates we
obtain quite successful ﬁts in our equations (adjusted R-square values are 0.33 for
the ﬁrst and 0.22 for the second dimension). For the ﬁrst dimension primary identity
as Muslim, degree of religiosity and attitudes towards turban and headscarf ban in
universities all have signiﬁcant impact on ideal positions of individuals in the
expected positive direction. Those who primarily identify themselves as Muslims
tend to be placed toward the pro-Islamist end of the ﬁrst dimension. As individuals’
degree of religiosity, their degree of support for the lifting of the ban on turban and
headscarves in universities increase, their position on this dimension moves closer to
the pro-Islamist end. Those who are unemployed and who actively seek a job tend to
be more towards the pro-Islamist end. The geographic divide continues to play
a signiﬁcant role in separating respondents on the ﬁrst dimension. Those who live in
Western provinces are more likely to be placed on the secularist end.
While the attitudes on education in Kurdish do not appear to have a signiﬁcant
impact, we observe that LeR self-placement scores are positively related to the ﬁrst
dimension ideal point estimates. Individual self-placement on the conventional LeR
dimension has a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient suggesting that individuals on the
right-end of the LeR dimension tend to be on the pro-Islamist end of the ﬁrst
dimension.
Primary identity choice appears to be much more eﬀective in shaping the second
dimension ideal point estimates. While those who consider themselves to be
primarily Turk or Turkish citizens tend to be placed towards the Turkish end of the
dimension, those who consider themselves primarily as Kurds tend to lie toward the
Kurdish end. Muslim identity, which diﬀerentiated individuals on the ﬁrst
dimension, appears insigniﬁcant in determining positions on this dimension. Level
of education, which is not signiﬁcant in diﬀerentiating individuals on the ﬁrst
dimension, appears to diﬀerentiate positions of individuals on the second. The
degree of religiosity and attitudes towards turban and headscarf ban both have small
but signiﬁcant impacts. As expected, increasing liberal attitude toward education in
25 See Berry and Feldman (1985) on measurement error in multiple regressions.
Kurdish push individuals towards the Kurdish end. LeR self-placement is once
again signiﬁcant in diﬀerentiating individuals on this dimension. When individuals
move toward the right (left)-end of the conventional LeR self-placement they tend
to be placed towards the Turkish (Kurdish) end of the second dimension. The fact
that LeR self-placement is signiﬁcantly related to both our dimensions is
a noteworthy ﬁnding suggesting ﬁrstly that LeR ideological divide is still relevant
Table 3
Explaining the ideal points on the Turkish political space
Dimension 1 (x-axis) Dimension 2 ( y-axis)
Secularist vs. pro-Islamist
cleavage
Kurdish vs. Turkish
nationalism
Unstandardized
coeﬃcients
Level of
signiﬁcance
Unstandardized
coeﬃcients
Level of
signiﬁcance
(Constant) 3.13 0.00 0.19 0.75
Sex (Z1 for Female,
Z0 for Male)
0.04 0.86 0.05 0.77
Age 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.33
Primary
identity
Dummy for Turk 0.58 0.17 0.91 0.00
Dummy for Muslim 0.94 0.04 0.44 0.17
Dummy for Turkish Citizen 0.20 0.61 0.91 0.00
Dummy for Kurd 0.05 0.95 1.48 0.01
Education Dummy for Illiterate 0.52 0.48 1.49 0.00
Dummy for Literate
but no schooling
0.28 0.68 1.18 0.02
Dummy for Primary
school graduate
0.77 0.07 0.71 0.02
Dummy for Junior
High school graduate
0.44 0.38 0.58 0.11
Dummy for High
school graduate
0.49 0.25 0.94 0.00
Number of people
living in the household
0.05 0.51 0.01 0.77
Degree of religiosity
(0 to 10 scale)
0.21 0.00 0.11 0.00
Attitude about
headscarf/turban in
universities (0 to 10 scale)
0.13 0.00 0.08 0.00
Attitude about education
in Kurdish (0 to 10 scale)
0.04 0.14 0.07 0.00
LefteRight self-placement
(1 to 10 scale)
0.38 0.00 0.20 0.00
Dummy for unemployed 0.75 0.04 0.17 0.50
Dummy for western provinces 0.62 0.02 0.22 0.23
Adjusted R-square 0.33 0.22
N 555 555
in the Turkish political space, but also secondly that it only partially accounts for
speciﬁc individual positioning along our estimated space.26
4. Conclusions
Our analysis presents several important results. The ﬁrst is the low dimensionality
of the Turkish political space. As such, the Turkish case is yet another evidence of
the low dimensional nature of ideological spaces in modern democracies. Two
dimensions dominate the ideological competition in the Turkish party system. The
relatively more dominant dimension is the secularist vs. pro-Islamist cleavage. It
largely overlaps with the center versus periphery formations in Turkish politics and
also the LeR orientations similar in some respects to the Western traditions. The
second dimension is the ethnic based nationalist cleavage contrasting the Turkish
and Kurdish identities. Perceptions of voters clearly diﬀerentiate all major parties
along these two dimensions. Compared to the conventional LeR ideological
dimension our two-dimensional political space better grasps the rising salience of
identity politics in the country while perfectly reﬂecting the conventional LeR
diﬀerentiation.
The second is the overwhelmingly centrist character of the electorate. The rising
disenchantment of the electorate from the existing parties is also evident in this
picture. In the minds of the Turkish voter, there exists a centrifugal force that pushes
the parties to the margins of the ideological space. The alienated voters, who assert
that they are not going to cast a vote to any one of the existing parties or simply
abstain from voting, comprised the largest segment of the electorate at the time of
our ﬁeldwork. This alienated segment lie at the center of the two dimensions.
Perhaps surprisingly, but certainly relieving from the perspective of potential conﬂict
implications, this alienated segment of voters is not close to hypothetical leaders
from the potentially extremist labor or pro-Islamist movements. This segment is also
just as distant to the nationalist MHP positions. There thus seems no ground for
political extremism to be born out of this group of disenchanted segment of voters.
We should note here one predictive success of our ﬁndings for the November 2002
elections. Cem Uzan who leads GP that obtained 7.3% of the vote in 2002 is
a prominent businessman with a controversial record. ANAP’s close positioning in
our map to the centrist majority of undecided voters appears to contradict the
observed results of November 2002 elections. We believe that this is primarily
a reﬂection of the fact that we had no measure of credibility of parties in our survey.
26 When we use only the LeR self-placements as the sole independent variable explaining individuals’
positions along our two dimensions, we would be leaving some of our relevant independent variables out
and thus commit a speciﬁcation error. However, as a simple reﬂection of the relative worth of the LeR in
grasping the information in our two-dimensional exposition we note that LeR self placement scores
account for 21% in the ﬁrst and 9% of the second dimension’s variation in individual placement scores.
Considering that our full models had an adjusted R-square of about 33% for the ﬁrst and 22% for the
second dimension, our two dimensions contain information that cannot be fully accounted by the
self-placements on the conventional LeR dimension.
Vote choice is not only a function of spatial proximity but rather it is a combination
of proximity as well as credibility evaluations. If in other words, a party lacks
credibility then its closeness to an individual ideal point may not predict the actual
vote choice for that individual who might vote for a party further away that seem to
be more credible and competent.27 We believe that lack of credibility and low
competence evaluations are responsible for the poor electoral performance of ANAP
in 2002 elections rather than its positioning on the political space. It remains to be
seen in further studies as to whether AKP, which came out to be the largest party in
2002 elections, has had high credibility and competence evaluations and is placed, as
expected, somewhere close to the center where most voters are.
Thirdly, we observe that identity questions help to diﬀerentiate diverse groups
from one another. While religiosity help diﬀerentiate the parties and their electorate
on the ﬁrst dimension, Alevi and Kurdish as opposed to Turkish primary identities
diﬀerentiate voters on the second.
Demographic characteristics also help identify several distinct patterns. Pro-
Islamist constituencies for example are more likely to be found in the Eastern rather
than on the Western provinces. The Kurdish nationalist orientations are more closely
associated with groups with relatively low education in contrast to highly educated
groups identifying with the Turkish nationalist end of the second dimension.
The heart of political competition according to our estimated political space
seems to be shaped around Turkish nationalism blended with varying dozes of pro-
Islamism. The future of Turkish democracy at the time of our survey in early 2001
seems to depend on the preferences of a large group of disenchanted voters. This
group has centrist orientations and is unattached to any of the potentially extremist
parties. Our analysis provides the critical issue linkages to the latent political space
and as such stands in stark contrast to the conventional LeR framework, which
remains too simplistic to grasp the complexities of the rising identity politics in
Turkey. As such, our analysis also provides a direct connection to the on going
reform process in the country that is aimed at starting the negotiations for full
membership in the European Union (EU). The issues concerning education in
Kurdish, headscarf/turban ban in the universities, the resolution of sectarian
conﬂicts between Sunnis and Alevis as well as expansion and maintenance of
religious freedoms in the country are all issues directly addressed in the Copenhagen
adjustment criteria that forms a prerequisite for the start of negotiations. Perceived
positions on the estimated political space are also reﬂective of this embedded reform
debate. A simplistic uni-dimensional LeR conceptualization simply does not reﬂect
diﬀerentiation on this complex mixture of issues around the discussions of EU-
related reform.
The traditionally state-centered Turkish left is still quite distant to such
argumentation and occupies positions on the ideological space that predominantly
reﬂects secularist stands opposing the pro-Islamist movements that seem to have
captured the impetus of the Turkish right. The two important minority groups that
27 See chapter 9 in Enelow and Hinich (1984).
overlap in some geographic locations of the country, that is, the Alevi and the
Kurdish communities, are isolated on the Turkish ideological map. CHP, which is
partially the continuation of the social-democratic elites who in the early 1990s
unsuccessfully brought the Kurdish representatives into the Parliament, is still the
closest party to both of these groups while the pro-Islamist FP is the most distant
one. Such a distant position of FP to both Alevis and Kurds leave the pro-Islamist
and ethnic Kurdish space totally unoccupied in the Turkish ideological space. Given
the centrality of these issues in the EU membership adjustments, it remains to be
seen how the Turkish party system can accommodate these identity debates into the
mainstream of electoral politics.
The success of AKP in 2002 and its ensuing performance in executive oﬃce
suggests that despite its pro-Islamist roots AKP was able to formulate moderate
policies in at least the ﬁrst two years of its tenure. It remains to be seen, however, as
to whether and to what extent the centrist constituencies have turned toward the
newly founded AKP. The framework of analysis presented above oﬀers a simple,
theoretically sound and policy-wise useful diagnosis tool that can be used to trace
these developments. With new data on the recent elections in November 2002, the
spatio-temporal stability of our results needs to be tested clarifying the positions of
AKP as well as GP in the political space of Turkey.
More interesting from the perspective of comparative spatial voting studies would
be a further study of the suggestion that arises from our above analysis that while the
ﬁrst dominant issue dimension may resonate the status quo political cleavage that is
historically most likely to reﬂect a LeR diﬀerentiation, the second dimension appears
more likely to grasp the debate around the political reform and change issues in the
country. Tracing the issue reﬂections in the latent political space by contrasting the
status quo to reform and change debate in electoral politics carries an attractive
potential to reshape our understanding of the evolution of electoral competition that
is larger than the implications of our above analysis for Turkish politics.
Appendix. Questions used in dimensionality analyses
The following items were used to secure an estimate of each respondent’s cardinal
evaluation of major parties. Each respondent was asked the following questions in
the order given below.
On an often-debated issue in Turkey concerning the headscarf and turban in
universities, some people assert that there should be no regulation on the attire of
students and that everyone should be able to wear what ever they want at the
universities. Others claim that wearing headscarves and turban at the universities
should be strictly forbidden. What is your position between these two extremes?
In another debate on the use of diﬀerent languages in education, some people
assert that Turkish is the oﬃcial language of the country and that education in
schools should only be in Turkish. Others claim that education in one’s native
language is a basic right and that everyone should be able to pursue education in
whatever language they wish. What is your position between these two extremes?
Evaluations for the following question is obtained separately for a very religious
leader, a prominent businessman, a labor union leader and the seven major parties
reported in the article. Separately an evaluation of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition’s
impact on general welfare of respondents’ family is also taken.
How would your family’s welfare be aﬀected in case the following parties,
institutions and hypothetical leaders were to come to power? 0 denotes the worst
possible impact, 5 represents no change from the current condition and 10 denotes
the best possible impact. Increasing scores from 0 to 10 denote improving impact
on your family’s condition.
The primary identity question is as follows:
When asked to make a choice, would you consider yourself to be primarily
a Turk, a Muslim, a citizen of Turkish Republic, a Kurd or an Alevi? Or
alternatively would you deﬁne yourself primarily with diﬀerent identity?
The conventional lefteright self-placement question is used with a 1 to 10 scale
and was worded as follows:
People frequently talk about ‘‘left’’ and ‘‘right’’ in politics. Below scale shows
boxes on a line. The ﬁrst box on the left represents left-most position in politics
and as one moves to the right the views each box represents also shifts to the right.
Finally the box on far right end of the scale represents the right-most view in
politics. Where would you place your political views on this line of boxes?
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